Why did Iran's president apologise?

13 hours ago Amir AzimiBBC Persian Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian surprised many observers when he apologised to Iran's neighbours for recent strikes against them, during an address delivered on Saturday morning as part of the country's interim leadership.

Apologies between states are rare, particularly during active conflict, and the wording stood out.

Leaders usually express "regret" or distance themselves from responsibility. Pezeshkian instead directly acknowledged that neighbouring countries had been targeted and said Iranian forces had now been asked to stop striking them unless attacks on Iran originate from their territory.

"I deem it necessary to apologise to neighbouring countries that were attacked," he said.

"We do not intend to invade neighbouring countries. " That alone raises the first question: was this a genuine apology, and why now?

One possibility is that the interim leadership is trying to contain the widening regional fallout.

Some countries in the region have been caught in the crossfire after strikes launched by the United States and Israel on Saturday 28 February.

Pezeshkian suggested these attacks were carried out under "fire at will" instructions after the initial wave of strikes killed senior Iranian commanders and disrupted central command structures.

By apologising, he may be trying to signal that Tehran does not want to escalate the war into a broader regional confrontation.

The message also implicitly acknowledges a political reality: even if some neighbouring countries allowed US forces to operate from bases on their territory, Iran risks isolating itself further if it openly targets them.

But whether the apology translates into policy is far less clear.

Reports from the region indicate that strikes linked to Iran or its forces have not yet stopped. Qatar and the UAE both said on Saturday afternoon they had intercepted missiles targeting them. If attacks like this continue, it raises a deeper question about control within Iran's fractured leadership structure.

Since the first wave of attacks killed key figures, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, decision-making has shifted to an interim leadership council.

In theory, that structure gives figures like Pezeshkian more influence than they previously had under a system dominated by a single supreme authority.

In practice, however, the ability to control powerful military and security institutions such as the Revolutionary Guards remains uncertain.

If Iranian-linked strikes on neighbouring states continue despite the president's statement, it would suggest either breakdowns in communication or resistance from factions unwilling to scale back the confrontation.

Hardline elements within the security establishment have long argued that regional pressure is Iran's strongest deterrent against US and Israeli military power.

Domestic reactions also reflect that tension. Some hardliners have already criticised Pezeshkian's remarks as weak.

The current political moment in Iran is unusual: several of the most powerful hardline figures at the top of the system are gone, but many lower-ranking officials and commanders remain deeply suspicious of any conciliatory tone.

For them, apologising to foreign governments risks appearing as capitulation at a time of national crisis. Outside Iran, the reaction has been shaped by a very different narrative.

Donald Trump quickly claimed on Truth Social that Iran had "apologised and surrendered" to its neighbours, arguing that the move proved US and Israeli military pressure was working.

The language also reveals how Washington may interpret Tehran's signals.

Trump has repeatedly insisted that the only acceptable outcome is Iran's "total surrender".

That demand creates a diplomatic paradox. Historically, countries rarely accept unconditional surrender under air campaigns alone, no matter how intense the bombing.

Without ground forces, forcing such an outcome is extremely difficult.

Interpreting Pezeshkian's apology as a form of capitulation could therefore serve as a political bridge for Washington: a way to claim progress without formally abandoning the demand for surrender.

For Pezeshkian and the interim leadership council, the calculation may be different.

Achieving a ceasefire now could stabilise the situation before a new permanent leader emerges.

If the next figure to dominate Iran's political system were a hardline cleric, the prospects for diplomacy could become even narrower.

That possibility raises another strategic question: is Pezeshkian positioning himself as a negotiable figure, the kind of pragmatic leader Western governments might prefer to deal with? In his address, he tried to balance defiance and openness, rejecting surrender while signalling restraint towards neighbouring states.

At the same time, the struggle over Iran's future leadership is already beginning to take shape.

Various political and clerical figures, as well as commanders within the IRGC and the security forces, may see the current crisis as an opportunity to strengthen their position.

Some are calling on the Assembly of Experts to move quickly to choose the next leader.

The ambiguity may be deliberate.

Pezeshkian's apology leaves room for several interpretations: a genuine attempt to calm regional tensions, a tactical move to buy time for Iran's interim leadership, or the opening signal of a political repositioning inside Tehran itself.

In a conflict shaped as much by internal power struggles as by external war, it may be all three at once